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I
n the 1940s, with the disclosure that Nazi doctors
had conducted experiments on humans, the term
research crime appeared for the first time. Most
Americans believed such abuses could never hap-
pen here. On a hot day in July 1972, however, the na-
tional front-page news described an experiment
sponsored by the U.S. government. In Macon County,
Alabama, a large group of Black men had gone un-
treated for syphilis. Over 4 decades, as some of them
died, the U.S. government went to great lengths to en-
sure that the men in the Tuskegee Study were denied
treatment, even after penicillin had become the stan-
dard of care in the mid-1940s (PrimeTime Live, 1992;
Jones, 1993).
Jones (1993) provides the definitive history of the
Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro
Male, the longest nontherapeutic experiment on human
beings in the history of medicine and public health.
Conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Public Health
Service (PHS), the study was originally projected to
last 6 months but wound up spanning 40 years, from
1932 to 1972. The men were never told that they had
the sexually transmitted disease. The 600 Black men in
the study (399 with syphilis and a control group of 201)
were the sons and grandsons of slaves (PrimeTime
Live, 1992). In Macon County, Alabama, most Black
people had never been seen by a doctor. When public
health announcements were made in churches and cot-
ton fields about a way to receive free medical care, the
men showed up in droves. Little did they know the high
price they would pay over the next 4 decades as they
were poked and prodded by an endless array of govern-
ment medical personnel (PrimeTime Live, 1992). The
goal of the study became to observe the participants to
the predetermined “end point”—autopsy. To ensure
that their families would agree to this final procedure,
the government offered burial insurance up to $50.
The study did not stop until Peter Buxtun, a former
PHS venereal disease investigator, shared the truth
about the study’s unethical methods with an Associated
Press reporter. Congressional hearings on the study
contributed to legislation on guidelines to protect hu-
man participants in research. Fred Gray, a civil rights
attorney, filed a $1.8 billion class action lawsuit that re-
sulted in a $10 million out-of-court settlement for the
victims, their families, and their heirs (Gray, 1998).
These facts about the Tuskegee Study have received
extensive coverage in both the mass media and profes-
sional literature (Gamble, 1997; Gamble & Fletcher,
1996; Gray, 1998; Guinan, 1993; Jones, 1992; Jones,
1993; Quinn, 1997; Thomas & Quinn, 1991).
CASTING LIGHT ON THE TUSKEGEE STUDY
The details this article brings to light, how-
ever—how the study began and how it developed to be-
come a metaphor for research abuse—are less familiar
to public health practitioners. The Chicago-based Jul-
ius Rosenwald Fund was a philanthropic organization
dedicated to the promotion of the health, education, and
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welfare of Black Americans. In 1928, the fund was in-
terested in expanding its activities to improve the health
status of Blacks in the rural South. The PHS had just
completed a study of the prevalence of syphilis in over
2,000 Black employees of Mississippi’s Delta Pine and
Land Company, and the Rosenwald Fund collaborated
with the PHS to provide treatment to the 25% of those
employees who had tested positive for syphilis. As an
outgrowth of that collaboration, Rosenwald conducted
demonstration programs to control syphilis in five rural
southern counties from 1929 to 1931. In Macon
County, one of the demonstration sites, 35% to 40% of
the people tested were found to have syphilis (Jones,
1993).
The stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing
Great Depression, however, devastated the Rosenwald
Fund’s financial resources needed for the treatment
phase of the program. The PHS was eager, however, to
salvage something of value from the project. It was also
eager to maintain the momentum of public health work
in Alabama by continuing its close working relation-
ship with state and local health officials and black lead-
ers at the Tuskegee Institute. In addition, Negro Health
Week, established in 1915 by Tuskegee Institute
founder Booker T. Washington, was by 1932 well on its
way to becoming a national movement that provided a
positive context for public health work in Black com-
munities (Quinn & Thomas, 1996). Where better to
conduct a study that the PHS called “an unparalleled
opportunity for the study of the effect of untreated
syphilis” (Jones, 1993) than in the Negro Health Move-
ment’s own backyard? The Tuskegee Study was born.
A hallmark of the Tuskegee Study, and a key to its
40-year life, was its culturally sensitive, commu-
nity-based approach. Black church leaders, elders in
the community, and owners of former plantations were
enlisted to recruit “subjects” for the study. A Black
nurse with the PHS, Eunice Rivers, was hired. The
word syphilis was never mentioned, and the men were
told they had “bad blood.” Incentives were offered in
the form of meals and rides into town to see the doctor.
In a Macon County where White rule over Blacks was
virtually absolute and where Blacks lived in extreme
poverty and with a total lack of access to health care,
there was no shortage of volunteers to participate in the
study.
A LEGACY OF DISTRUST
As the truth emerged about what happened during
those 4 decades in Tuskegee, we learned a lot about
what can happen when scientific ends take precedence
over basic human rights. The men of Tuskegee were
treated not as autonomous human beings deserving of
respect and dignity but as a means to an end. Even when
effective treatment of syphilis with penicillin rendered
the study only marginally relevant, the men’s careers as
human guinea pigs continued. Recruited into the study
with half-truths and euphemisms, they were kept there
with outright lies. They were denied simple, affordable
treatment; the health and the lives of these Black men
and their sex partners were deemed expendable.
The years that followed the revelations did little to
alleviate Tuskegee-generated distrust of the govern-
ment and the medical establishment among African
Americans. The U.S. government was officially silent
on the subject for more than 25 years (Thomas &
Quinn, 1997).
A February 1992 story aired by ABC’s PrimeTime
Live offers telling—and chilling—insight into the
thinking behind the continuation of the Tuskegee Study
(PrimeTime Live, 1992). Correspondent Jay Schadler
interviewed Dr. Sidney Olansky, the PHS officer who
directed the study from 1950 to 1957, when penicillin
was the standard of care for syphilis except for the men
in the Tuskegee Study. Asked if the experiment could
have been conducted on a group of White men,
Olansky replied, “I think it could have been if we’d had
white men in the same general category. Say if we had a
bunch of hillbillies up in West Virginia that had a lot of
syphilis.” Pressed by Schadler about the lies that the
men were told, Olansky said, “The fact that they were
illiterate was helpful, too, because they couldn’t read
the newspapers. If they were not, as things moved on
they might have been reading newspapers and seen
what was going on.” When Schadler presented state-
ments from survivors who thought that the diagnostic
spinal taps they received were treatments, the doctor re-
plied, smiling, “I don’t know what they were told. I
mean, sometimes people will say things that they don’t
really mean or don’t really believe in order to accom-
plish something they want.” In response to a question
about why if the government doctors had done nothing
wrong they were no longer trusted by the men, Olansky
replied, “Someone got them all heated up. They were
easily swayed. They were like a pack of sheep.”
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Finally, Olansky’s summary of what was learned:
“Syphilis isn’t too bad a disease.”
Tuskegee has become part of the folklore of racism,
part of the collective memory of Black people as fami-
lies retold the story in the oral tradition. It has lain dor-
mant there and contributed to Black people’s mistrust
of medical care and public health. This legacy may help
explain why African Americans are reluctant to take
their medications when they do finally see doctors, why
they come in late for treatment, why they suffer dispro-
portionately from many diseases for which there are
cures (Gamble, 1997; Guinan, 1993; Jones, 1992;
Quinn, 1997).
According to Dr. Eric Goosby, director of the Office
of HIV/AIDS Policy, “Conquering the HIV/AIDS epi-
demic in the African-American community will
demand creation of improved programs which will
focus on prevention, HIV testing, counseling, and treat-
ment” (Goosby, 1999). In addition to HIV/AIDS,
Goosby’s admonition is applicable to the other priority
areas in the national campaign to eliminate racial and
ethnic health disparities (infant mortality, cancer
screening and management, cardiovascular disease,
diabetes, and child and adult immunization) (Goodwin,
2000). Part of the challenge is overcoming the legiti-
mate mistrust of a biomedical research establishment
that has used and abused vulnerable populations. In
addition to Tuskegee, Moreno (1998, 2000) cites exam-
ples of research abuse on vulnerable populations that
include but are not limited to the following:
1. Nazi experimentation: During World War II, the Nazis
conducted horrific experiments on concentration camp
prisoners.
2. Willowbrook State School: Mentally retarded children
were purposely exposed to hepatitis.
3. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital: Elderly patients
were injected with live cancer cells without their
consent.
4. Milgram studies of obedience: Stanley Milgram’s
studies of obedience in the 1960s were called unethical
because of the potential for psychological damage
caused by research subjects being told to deliver
“bogus” dangerous electrical shocks to other partici-
pants as punishments for wrong answers to a set of
questions.
5.
Human radiation experiments: In the 1950s and early
1960s, the U.S. government conducted nearly 100
atmospheric nuclear tests at the Nevada test site. These
tests released radioactive iodine-131 and a variety of
other radioactive substances into the environment. The
people downwind of the tests and others across the
country were exposed to these cancer-causing agents
in the air, in water, and in milk.
The legacy of the Tuskegee Study is not only a
shadow on our efforts to eliminate health disparities but
also a source of strength for demonstrating exactly
what works to promote health and prevent disease. The
participation of African Americans in medical and pub-
lic health research is critical. PHS grant applications
now require the inclusion of women and minorities in
human subjects research. However, this is the context
in which Tuskegee has become a code word for treating
vulnerable populations as objects in research on human
subjects, a means to an end, less than human.
Today, the Tuskegee Study transcends its historical
time and geographical context to emerge as a metaphor
for racism in the context of research. Tuskegee is a red
flag for bioethics, a warning that is raised with justifica-
tion whenever researchers are dealing with vulnerable
populations, when issues of trust, justice, and espe-
cially race come together to shape the social context of
the research project.
BEYOND THE LEGACY OF TUSKEGEE
What was done cannot be undone, but we can end the
silence. What the United States government did was
shameful, and I am sorry.
President Bill Clinton, 1997
On May 16, 1997, a quarter century after the story
became widely known, President William Jefferson
Clinton issued a formal apology for the Syphilis Study
at Tuskegee. During the ceremony in the East Room of
the White House, the President directed his words to
Carter Howard, Frederick Moss, Charlie Pollard,
Herman Shaw, Fred Simmons, Sam Doner, Ernest
Hendon, and George Key, the study’s survivors. All of
these men were by then more than 90 years old, and 5 of
them were present for the occasion. Clinton and the
others present experienced forgiveness from men who
had suffered at the hands of PHS doctors. The president
placed responsibility for the abuse on the medical re-
search establishment, stating, “The people who ran the
study at Tuskegee diminished the stature of man by
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abandoning the most basic ethical precepts. They for-
got their pledge to heal and repair.” Clinton announced
that the government was providing a $200,000 grant to
help establish a center for bioethics in research and
health care at Tuskegee University as part of a memo-
rial to the victims. Herman Shaw expressed gratitude to
Clinton “for doing [his] best to right this wrong tragedy
and to resolve that Americans should never again allow
such an event to occur” (Thomas & Quinn, 1997).
TOWARD TRUST AND ATONEMENT
Rebuilding trust begins with an apology from a pres-
ident who was not even alive in 1932 when the study
began. Over the years, the Tuskegee legacy has under-
gone transformation from science to conspiracy to met-
aphor. It is an American tragedy made of a volatile con-
fluence of race and health care. It is part of the collec-
tive memory of many African Americans, fueling sus-
picion and fear toward medical and public health re-
search. It is still being deeply woven into the tapestry of
American life. An indelible pattern is evolving as each
of us responds to the contingencies and values exposed
by Tuskegee. In a way, the legacy connects us to all
people who have suffered or continue to suffer under
oppression—from Africans on the Middle Passage to
Native American tribes forced to extinction to Holo-
caust victims to victims of human radiation experi-
ments to survivors of apartheid.
An apology is an expression of our humanity, a balm
on the sores of resentment and retaliation. It will not
heal all wounds, but it is an essential gesture in the heal-
ing process and a cue to action for the rest of us to move
toward atonement and racial reconciliation. It may be
the first step in addressing the fear and mistrust that
shape the behavior and attitudes of many people of
color, not only toward participating in medical and pub-
lic health research but also toward receiving the health
care they need and deserve.
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